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NOTES
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY MINORS:
A QUESTION OF LAW OR FACT?
Juvenile law has grown up. In re Gault' has destroyed the child-
ishness which had made a constitutional delinquent of that body of
social experiment and legal exceptions applying to the juvenile court.
A child may now look up at his accusers and demand notice of charges
against him, counsel, confrontation and cross-examination of wit-
nesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination.2
But with this maturity comes a host of problems having no coun-
terparts in the law dealing with the adult offender. This note is to
treat but one: the competence of a child to waive his constitutional
rights, for the purposes of juvenile court as well as criminal court
proceedings.
Waiver of Constitutional Rights
Little authority need be cited for the proposition that constitu-
tional rights can be waived.3 The Supreme Court of the United
States, in Escobedo v. Illinois,4 recognized that
[tihe accused may, of course, intelligently and knowingly waive his
privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel either at a
pre-trial stage or at the trial.5
The traditional definition of waiver as a voluntary relinquishment of
a known right is fully applicable to rights of constitutional genre.6
To waive a constitutional right, one must have both knowledge of the
existence of the right and the intention to abandon it.7 In other
words, an effective waiver assumes lack of ignorance, intimidation
and fear. Necessarily, each case is peculiar in its consideration of an
alleged waiver:
The determination of whether there has been arn intelligent waiver
. must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circum-
stances surrounding that case, including the background, experience,
and conduct of the accused.8
Waiver by a Minor: A Question of Fact
Waiver is therefore a question of fact. And in the cases we are
considering, the fact is that the accused is a juvenile. Should this
1 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2 Id. at 33, 41, 42-57.
3 E.g., United States v. Drunmond, 354 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1965); DeRose
v. United States, 315 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1963).
4 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
5 Id. at 490 n.14.
6 Walker v. Peppersack, 316 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1963).
7 Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965); Commonwealth
ex rel. Whiting v. Cavell, 244 F. Supp. 560 (M.D. Pa. 1965).
8 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See People v. Chesser, 29
Cal. 2d 815, 178 P.2d 761 (1947).
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fact alone preclude a valid waiver as a matter of law? In civil mat-
ters, a minor is certainly legally incompetent in a wide variety of situ-
ations. A child cannot be held on his personal contract;9 he cannot
alone convey his real property; 10 he cannot maintain a suit without a
guardian ad litem.11
No one would contend that every minor lacks the cognizance and
shrewdness requisite for the protection of his interests in these affairs,
but common experience demands the recognition that exceptions are
rare. The law adopts the general rule at the nominal expense of a few,
thereby insuring the protection required by the majority.
An analogy to the issue of waiver is compelling. If a minor is
incompetent in matters of simple contract, should he not be powerless
to surrender his constitutional rights? If, as a matter of law, a minor
is unable to waive the requirement that a civil action against him be
brought through the appointment of a guardian, 2 there would ap-
pear to be no sound reason why a distinction should exist to accommo-
date a waiver of the right to counsel or the privilege against self-
incrimination. Nonetheless, the distinction exists. The courts con-
sistently treat age as simply another element in the total array of
circumstances which must be considered in seeking an intelligent and
competent waiver.'3 Statements such as this are common:
Although minority itself would not prevent an intelligent waiver
... it is an important circumstance to be observed in the consid-
eration of the other factors of the case .... 14
Consider the practical consequences of treating a child as incom-
petent to waive his rights. If a juvenile cannot as a matter of law
waive his right to counsel, then it might be necessary for the police to
insure the prompt acquisition of a lawyer, the child's parents or a
9 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 34-36, 1556-57.
10 CAL. CIv. CODE § 33.
11 CAL. CiV. CODE § 42; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 372-73.
12 Hess v. Gerhart, 19 Pa. D. & C. 253 (C.P. Lancaster Co. 1933).
13 See Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 1160, 1162 n.2 (1960).
14 People v. Hardin, 207 Cal. App. 2d 336, 340-41, 24 Cal. Rptr. 563, 566
(1962).
In determining whether incriminating statements are voluntary, age of
the person should be considered, but statements should not be ruled inadmis-
sible merely because of the youth of the maker. People v. Magee, 217 Cal.
App. 2d 443, 457, 31 Cal. Rptr. 658, 667 (1963). "The age of a defendant minor,
his education and his lack of previous experience with the law are also im-
portant factors to be considered in determining the voluntariness of a con-
fession." State v. White, 146 Mont. 226, 234, 405 P.2d 761, 765, cert. denied,
384 U.S. 1023 (1965). Where a waiver of right to counsel is relied on, thejuvenile court "must affirmatively find as a fact that by reason of 'age, edu-
cation, and information, and all other pertinent facts' the minor is able to and
did make an intelligent waiver." McBride v. Jacobs, 247 F.2d 595, 596 (D.C.
Cir. 1957). See Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 624, 625 (1963).
It is important to recognize the waiver implications in a case which dis-
cusses the voluntariness of a minor's confession. A decision that a confession
was involuntary is also a holding that the defendant made no voluntary
waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination. That immaturity alone
does not render a confession involuntary is equivalent to the rule that a
minor is not incapable of making a voluntary relinquishment of his priv-
ilege against self-incrimination.
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guardian ad litem. This is not too great a burden. However, if the
child cannot waive his privilege against self-incrimination, then no
statement made by him after being taken into custody-before, at
least, adult assistance is by his side-could ever be used against him.
It is therefore not surprising to hear a judge say that such a develop-
ment would "unduly restrict law enforcement."15
Waiver remains a question of fact even though the defendant is ajuvenile; age weighs heavily, but is by no means conclusive.16 The
general rule17 that courts indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver of constitutional rights has particular significance in
this context.' 8
Sources of Incompetence
The circumstances which occasionally prevent an effective waiver
by an adult are conspicuous by their absence in the case of a juvenile.
The obvious source of incompetence to be expected in a minor is
simple inability to comprehend. Immaturity, illiteracy and inexperi-
ence are concomitants of youth. Words like "counsel" and "self-
incrimination" will convey little assurance to a child so afflicted. For
a waiver to fit its definition, it must be an abandonment of a known
right. To know of the right to counsel is to know not only the nature
of the right, but also its significance: the practical advantages of
having a lawyer must be appreciated. 19 Such an understanding is
beyond the grasp of most juvenile defendants. Thus, it has been held
15 People v. Magee, 217 Cal. App. 2d 443, 457, 31 Cal. Rptr. 658, 667 (1963)
(Bray, J.).
16 A good number of decisions have squarely held the issue of waiver not
to be one of law:
"There is nothing .. . that supports the defendants' contentions, except
that they were seventeen and eighteen years of age. We are of the opinion
that this fact standing alone is not sufficient to void a confession when the
same is validly made under the law." Olivera v. State, 354 P.2d 792, 794
(Okla. Crim. 1960). In State v. Kelley, 253 Iowa 1314, 115 N.W.2d 184 (1962),
this language was cited with approval.
"The competence of a seventeen-year-old criminal defendant to waive his
right to counsel is a question of fact." Williams v. Huff, 142 F.2d 91, 92 (D.C.
Cir. 1944).
"To find that it was inadmissible, we would have to hold that any con-
fession made by a person who is not yet eighteen years old is involuntary
unless one of his parents or his attorney is present. This is not the law."
State v. Stewart, 176 Ohio St. 156, 159-60, 198 N.E.2d 439, 442, cert. denied, 379
U.S. 947 (1964).
"A statutory definition of minority, without more, does not in itself ren-
der inadmissible confessions or admissions of an infant." De Souza v. Barber,
263 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 989 (1959).
17 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1038). Accord, Emspak v. United
States, 349 U.S. 190, 198 (1955); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70
(1942).
Is Juvenile courts have been especially admonished to demand intelli-
gent and competent waivers of the rights which legislatures have seen fit to
give minors. Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir.
1956).
19 See Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems
of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7, 33.
NOTES
in a recent New Jersey case 20 that notice by police of constitutional
rights to two boys, ages 13 and 15, lacked significant weight in deter-
mining the voluntariness of their subsequent confessions made in the
absence of parents or counsel.
In addition, the child is peculiarly susceptible to his ervironment.
All but the most hardened, habitual offenders are likely to be over-
awed by the state's law enforcement machinery. In these intimidating
surroundings, the juvenile is impressed with the desirability of full
cooperation; to assume an antagonistic posture by asking for a
lawyer or refusing to speak seems to the child a highly undesirable
alternative.2 1 Waiver must be a voluntary act, and the probable ab-
sence of free volition under these circumstances is plain.
The great majority of the cases which invalidate alleged waivers
by juveniles are more concerned with the child's reaction to his en-
vironment than with his innate ignorance. In Gallegos v. Colorado,22
a 14-year-old murder defendant was detained for 5 days without see-
ing his mother or a lawyer, after which he signed a confession. The
conviction was reversed, the Supreme Court finding an abuse of due
process. The Court based its decision on the "totality of circum-
stances" :
23
The youth of the petitioner, the long detention, the failure to send
for his parents, the failure immediately to bring him before the judge
of the Juvenile Court, the failure to see to it that he had the advice
of a lawyer or a friend .... 24
Similar analysis produced the same result in Haley v. Ohio,25 where
a 15-year-old boy charged with murder had been questioned by relays
of police for 5 hours without advice from a friendly adult.26
But the facts in Gallegos and Haley are exaggerated as compared
to the standard case; the claim of incompetent waiver usually involves
little more than assertions of subtle intimidation, fright or bewilder-
ment. Each decision is therefore a product of what Justice Frank-
furter called "psychological judgment that reflects deep, even if in-
articulate, feelings of our society."27
Gault and the Waiver Issue
It has been shown that uniform past practice has ben treatment
20 In re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 225 A.2d 110 (1966). •
21 "Most kids, when confronted by the police; not-only confess to the
matter at issue, but will voluntarily involve themselves and others in of-
fenses the officers had not even heard of. . . EN] ot having the mature
experience of us adults, . . . they usually 'shoot the works,' afnd 'sing."'
Long, Headaches of a Judge-A Challenge to the Bar, 27 WASH. L. REv. 130,
135 (1952).
22 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
23 Id. at 55.
24 Id.
25 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
26 Accord, United States v. Morales, 233 F. Supp. 160 (D, Mont. 1964)
(16-year-old held overnight and interrogated without a lawyer); People v.
De Flumer, 16 N.Y.2d 20, 209 N.E.2d 93, 261 N.Y.S.2d 42, cert. denied, 384 U.S.
1018 (1965) (15-year-old defendant withheld from parents overnight and for
2' more days before he confessed and was assigned counsel).
27 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 603 (1948) '(concurring opinion).
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of waiver as a question of fact.28  The Gault29 decision heightens the
importance of the issue. Indeed, Justice Fortas' opinion recognizes
this dimension of the Gault command:
We appreciate that special problems may arise with respect to waiver
of the privilege (self-incrimination) by or on behalf of children, and
that there may well be some differences in technique-but not in
principle-depending upon the age of the child and the presence and
competence of parents.3 0
It is clear enough that the Court does not intend to upset the settled
law of waiver by a minor; additional language of the opinion makes
more explicit the desire of the Court that the fact-finding process be
tempered with caution for the protection of the child.31 This is the
"principle" of which the Court speaks.
The progressive sweep of the Gault decision has therefore left
the law of juvenile waiver exactly where it was. This has been rec-
ognized in California in two significant developments. The California
Legislature, while enacting Gault-inspired amendments to the juve-
nile court laws in the summer of 1967, made it quite clear that it did
not intend to prohibit competent waivers by juveniles.32 Secondly, in
People v. Gomez, 33 decided on August 24, 1967, it was decided-with
full appreciation of Gault-that a minor does not have "the right,
ipso facto, to disaffirm a waiver merely by asserting his non-age at
the trial."3
4
Alternative Approaches to Waiver
The existing rule that it is possible for a minor to waive his rights
has not gone without criticism, however. In In re Castro,3 5 a ju-
venile court case, the 16-year-old accused confessed before he was told
of his right to counsel. The appellate court held the confession ad-
missible,36 but the court availed itself of the opportunity to speculate
28 See text at notes 9-18 supra.
29 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
30 Id. at 55.
31 "If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an ad-
mission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the ad-
mission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it has not been coerced or
suggested, but also that it is not the product of ignorance of rights or of
adolescent fantasy, fright or despair." Id.
32 The amended relevant part of CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 372 reads as
follows: "Nothing in this section or in any other provision . .. is intended
by the Legislature to prohibit a minor from exercising an intelligent and
knowing waiver of his constitutional rights in any proceeding under the
Juvenile Court Law. .. "
Other new provisions require the allowance or appointment of counsel
at various stages of procedure unless there is an intelligent waiver. See CAL.
WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 625, 627.5, 634, 700.
33 60 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1967).
34 Id. at 885.
35 243 Cal.'App. 2d 402, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1966).
36 CAL. WE.F. & LNST'NS CODE § 701 provides that the juvenile court judge
may support his findings with only such evidence as would be admissible in
a criminal case, although admission of evidence in the juvenile court pro-
ceeding is governed only by the rules of materiality and relevance.
Thus, under pre-Gault California law, any relevant confession would be
admissible in the juvenile court proceeding, but the judge would be precluded
NOTES
on the problem of waiver-anticipating the day when Miranda v.
Arizona3 7 might apply to children. After reviewing the many civil
disabilities of minors, it is asked: "How then can he be expected
knowingly and effectively to waive his constitutional rights?"38
In Williams v. Huff,3 9 it was decided that the competence of a boy
17-years-old to waive his right to counsel in a criminal case was a
question of fact. Justice Edgerton wrote the opinion, but noted his
dissatisfaction:
It seems to me . . .as a matter of law that a boy of seventeen
cannot competently waive his right to counsel in a criminal case. In
saying this I do not speak for the court.40
Only one case has been found which cites this language with ap-
proval,41 and one Ninth Circuit opinion has expressly repudiated it.42
In Urbasek v. People,43 arising in the juvenile court, the Appellate
Court of Illinois considered the propriety of allowing an 11-year-old
boy to waive his privileges against search and seizure and self-
incrimination, which the court assumed would be applicable by force
of the Federal Constitution:
[W)e are not persuaded that the State may assert a claim of waiver
against respondent. The protection . . .is a fundamental right, and
its loss by waiver by a minor would be contrary to the "laudable
purposes of Juvenile Courts" . . . .44
There is even a contribution at this point from the highest court
in the land. In Gallegos45 it was said:
[A] fourteen-year old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to
have any conception of what will confront him when he is made ac-
cessible only to the police. That is to say, we deal with a person who
is not equal to the police . . . and who is unable to know how to
protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his constitu-
tional rights. 46
But it has already been explained that the Gallegos decision turned
on the "totality of circumstances," 47 and not on any rule of law that
a minor, "no matter how sophisticated," is incapable of making a com-
petent waiver.
from using the confession to support his findings unless it could be shown
preliminarily that the minor had been warned of his rights and had then
made a competent waiver. In the Castro case, it had not been shown that
the minor had been warned of his right to counsel; although the confession
was admissible, it was held, nevertheless, that it could not be considered.
37 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda requires that a person in custody must,
prior to questioning, be told of his right to remain silent, that what he says
may be used against him, that he may consult with counsel, and that, if he is
indigent, a lawyer will be afforded him. Id. at 478-79.
38 In re Castro, 243 Cal. App. 2d 402, 409, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469, 473 (1966).
39 142 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
40 Id. at 92.
41 In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224, 228 (D.D.C. 1955); it was cited to support
dicta that a boy of 16 is incapable of deciding whether he should demand a
jury trial.
42 De Souza v. Barber, 263 F.2d 470 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 989
(1959).
43 76 Il1. App. 2d 375, 222 N.E.2d 233 (1966).
44 Id. at 385, 222 N.E.2d at 238.
45 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
46 Id. at 54.
47 Notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
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Until now, no attempt has been made in this note to distinguish
the practices in juvenile courts and criminal courts. Since the Gault
decision has made constitutional rights equally applicable in the ju-
venile courts, it would at first seem that no differences should exist,
but the District of Columbia Circuit recognizes a special circum-
stance in which a juvenile cannot be deemed to have waived his
privilege against self-incrimination: when the youth has made dam-
aging admissions while in police custody before the juvenile court has
waived its jurisdiction of the case and transferred it to the criminal
court. In Harling v. United States, 48 Judge Bazelon stated that to
admit such statements in the criminal court
would be tantamount to a breach of faith with the child, since he
cannot be charged with knowledge of either his privilege against self-
incrimination or the Juvenile Court's power to waive its jurisdiction
and subject him to criminal penalties. 49
The court applied this rule as a matter of law.50
The Harling opinion specifically avoided the question of spon-
taneous statements-utterances not in the course of official interroga-
tion. Since the due process argument of the opinion rested upon the
element of breach of faith with the child, it is difficult to see how a
valid distinction might be made with respect to spontaneous state-
ments. The expectancy of the child would be the same in any case;
the obligation to speak is there, whether or not an "official interroga-
tion" has commenced. It is therefore not at all askew of the Harling
doctrine to conclude that all statements made by a minor prior to
waiver of jurisdiction to the criminal court should be inadmissible
against the child in the criminal proceeding. This should apply as a
matter of course-irrespective of alleged waivers by the minor-since
the Harling rule precludes consideration of any possibility that the
child fully understood that he could be transferred to the criminal
court.
It must be concluded that the supposed undercurrent of judicial
displeasure with the question-of-fact approach to the problem of
waiver (suggested by some writers) 51 has an insubstantial founda-
tion of case rhetoric for its support. With the exception of the dictum
in Huff,52 and possibly that in Castro,53 the statements which might
48 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
49 Id. at 163.
50 Judge Bazelon said this in so many words: "Moreover, we do not be-
lieve that the question of admissibility of the child's statements as evidence
against him in the District Court should vary from case to case depending on
criteria which could at best only partially indicate the child's capacity to
waive his right." Id. at 164 n.12.
One writer has suggested that a wedding of the Harling and Gallegos
doctrines should require the exclusion of all pretransfer admissions, even if
the juvenile had the active assistance of counsel. See Note, Due Process
Reasons for Excluding Juvenile Court Confessions From Criminal Trials, 50
CALF. L. REv. 902, 907 (1962).
51 See Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 1VMNr. L. REv. 547,
572 (1957); Note, Due Process Reasons for Excluding Juvenile Court Confes-
sions From Criminal Trials, 50 CALiF. L. REV. 902, 905 (1962); Comment, The
Juvenile Offender and Self-Incrimination, 40 WAsH. L. Rav. 189, 200 (1965).
52 Williams v. Huff, 142 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
53 In re Castro, 243 Cal. App. 2d 402, 409, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469, 473 (1966).
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be interpreted to favor placing a shroud of incompetence over every
minor are little more than products of make-weight tendency and
loose verbiage. When it is confronted with the compulsion to choose
between the two alternatives, we must conclude that no court is
likely to break with tradition.
Instead, there are at least two alternatives which may be used to
deal with the waiver problems which Gault intensifies. Some jurisdic-
tions have taken steps toward the tightening of waiver requirements.
In Oklahoma, the trend is indicated by the structure of the rule which
has developed: a minor is presumed to be incapable of waiving consti-
tutional and statutory rights unless it clearly appears that the minor
fully understood the consequences.54 In Alabama, it was provided by
statute55 that a confession by a child under 16 years of age was inad-
missible against the child.56 A 1923 amendment diminished the scope
of the statute so as to allow the admission of such a confession in juve-
nile court and bar its admission against the child "in any civil, crimi-
nal, or other cause or proceeding whatever ....
The second and more feasible route is the modification of prac-
tices of law enforcement officers and juvenile courts to the end of
eliminating the need for assessing a youth's competency to waive his
rights. The Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure of the Cali-
fornia Bar has proposed that "no statement taken from a juvenile
under eighteen ... be utilized in any subsequent criminal proceeding
unless made in the presence of his attorney."'5 8  This is appropriate
enough when the child desires counsel, but if he has waived that
right-if he is so permitted-are his statements inadmissible never-
theless? Such a proposal must be predicated upon the assumption
that a minor is incompetent to waive his right to counsel-at least for
the purpose of determining the admissibility of statements made in
the absence of an attorney-else the benefits of the reform might be
denied to those most in need of its protection.
Moreover, the presence of an attorney should certainly not be the
sole criterion; a parent or guardian can speak for the child just as
effectively.5 9 Sight must not be lost of the fact that what is required
for a competent waiver is only maturity of judgment. California has
chosen to rely ultimately on the judgment of the parent or guardian
in juvenile court proceedings. Notice of constitutional rights, includ-
ing the right to counsel, is required to be given to the minor and his
54 Olivera v. State, 354 P.2d 792 (Okla. Crim. 1960); Clark v. State, 95
Okla. Crim. 375, 246 P.2d 422 (1952); Fields v. State, 77 Okla. Crim. 1, 138
P.2d 124 (1943).
55 Ala. Code 1907 § 6464.
56 This statute was not given an expansive interpretation. Where a 16-
year-old made statements to the police in the presence of his father, the stat-
ute was deemed inapplicable. Corbin v. State, 19 Ala. App. 439, 98 So. 132,
cert. denied, Ex parte Corbin, 210 Ala. 369, 98 So. 134 (1923).
57 ALA. CODE, tit. 13, § 377 (1958).
58 41 CAL. S.B.J. 798, 803 (1966).
59 "Where the court finds for any reason the minor is not capable of a
waiver [of right to counsel] the parent may so waive provided the court also
finds there is no conflict of interest between them, and of course the waiver
by the parent must be an intelligent, knowing act." McBride v. Jacobs, 247
F.2d 595, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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parent or guardian during at least one of three stages: when the
child is initially brought before the probation officer,60 at the deten-
tion hearing6' and at the juvenile court hearing.6 2 Counsel is to be
appointed if either the minor or his parent or guardian so requests0 3
The right to counsel cannot, therefore, be waived solely by the child;
there must be concurrence in this decision by his parent or guardian,
whose consideration is actively solicited.
Conclusion
A minor may waive his constitutional rights, providing the cir-
cumstances permit a knowing, intelligent relinquishment. California
has enacted safeguards in the Juvenile Court Law which should pre-
vent the injustices which might otherwise result from allowing a
child to waive his right to counsel. However, the legislature has
stated explicitly that it does not intend to disapprove of the recogni-
tion of competent waiver by children. This would not necessarily
foreclose the development of an exclusionary rule by the courts. Such
a rule could not have as its foundation a construction of legislative
purpose, but could very well be based upon the judicial conclusion
that a rule of law nullifying all juvenile waivers is essential to the
preservation of minors' constitutional rights.
Gary G. Strieker*
60 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 627.5.
61 CAL. WELP. & INST'NS CODE § 634.
62 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 700.
03 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 627.5, 634, 700.
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